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Abstract: The intent of this paper is to review some timestamp-
based password authentication schemes using smart cards which 
have similar working principles. Many of the proposed timestamp-
based password authentication schemes were subsequently found to 
be insecure. Here, we investigate three schemes with similar 
working principles, show that they are vulnerable to tricky forgery 
attacks, and thus they fail to ensure the level of security that is 
needed for remote login procedure using smart cards. Though there 
are numerous works available in this field, to the best of our 
knowledge this is the first time we have found some critical flaws 
in these schemes that were not detected previously. Along with the 
proofs of their flaws and inefficiencies, we note down our solution 
which could surmount all sorts of known attacks and thus reduces 
the probability of intelligent forgery attacks. We provide a detailed 
literature review how the schemes have been developed and 
modified throughout years. We prove that some of the schemes 
which so far have been thought to be intractable are still flawed, in 
spite of their later improvements.  
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1. Introduction 
Remote server in a Client/Sever system requires password 
from the user to verify the legitimacy of access-requesting 
user. The password given by the user could not be 
transmitted to the server in plain text format because of 
security reasons. Usually, we consider the presence of 
insecure channels for the communications between remote 
server and user, where an eavesdropper could tap the 
transmitted messages and may try to forge false messages 
later at a suitable time. To secure the communications 
between remote server and user, several timestamp-based 
password authentication schemes have been proposed so far 
to protect users’ passwords while transmitting those over 
insecure channels.  
Starting from 1999, by this time a wide variety of timestamp-
based password authentication schemes have been proposed, 
most of which fail to guarantee the level of security needed 
for remote password authentication procedure. Once one 
scheme had been proposed, for some time it was thought to 
be secure but later was found as faulty. Up to today, there 
are some schemes that have remained unchallenged and have 
been thought to be flawless. However, after detailed analysis 
of all those schemes, we have found the weaknesses for 
some of the unchallenged solutions. In this paper, we note 
down a brief history of timestamp-based password 
authentication schemes and show that many of them are 
inefficient as they cannot provide the required level of 
security that the authors claimed to achieve in their 
proposals. It should be noted that, in this paper we used the 
names of the authors to distinguish different schemes. 
The major contributions of this paper are: 
1. A detailed literature review of the timestamp-based 
password authentication schemes using smart cards. 
2. Cryptanalysis and pointing out the inefficiencies of 
Wang-Li’s [1] improved scheme. 
3. Cryptanalysis of the password authentication scheme 
proposed by Yang, Wang, and Chang [2]. 
4. Cryptanalysis of Kim et al.’s [3] improved password 
authentication scheme. 
5. Comments on the improved schemes, pointing out their 
weaknesses, and suggesting the feasible solution. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section 2 
presents the literature review and relevant works that 
motivated us to write this paper, Section 3 recaps the basic 
scheme proposed by Yang and Shieh, Section 4 presents the 
cryptanalysis of Wang-Li’s scheme, Section 5 presents the 
cryptanalysis  of Yang-Wang-Chang’s scheme, Section 6 
shows the flaws of Kim et al.’s improved scheme, Section 7 
talks about the crucial points for the flaws in the schemes, 
Section 8 notes down our improved solution for the 
completeness of this paper, and Section 9 concludes the 
paper delineating the achievements from this work. 
2. Literature Review and Motivation 
In 1999, Yang and Shieh [4] proposed two password 
authentication schemes with smart cards one of which was 
the timestamp-based password authentication scheme. In 
2002, Chan and Cheng [5] showed that [4] is vulnerable to 
forged login attack and an adversary could be able to 
impersonate as a legal user to pass the system authentication. 
Fan et al. [6] presented a cryptanalysis of [4] and showed a 
different type of attack than that of [5] and also proposed an 
enhanced scheme which they claimed to withstand Chan-
Cheng attack and the attack that they demonstrated in their 
paper. But later, [7] showed that Fan et al.’s scheme was still 
insecure and vulnerable to forged login attack. Again, [8] 
showed two other attacks on Fan et al.’s enhanced scheme. 
Shen et al. [9] came up with one enhanced scheme based on 
[4] which they claimed to be efficient enough to protect the 
authentication process from forged login or forged server 
attacks. Unfortunately, later [10], [11], [12] and, [13] 
showed that the improved scheme proposed by Shen et al. 
was still vulnerable to the forgery attacks. 
Wang and Li [1] proposed a separate improved scheme 
based on Yang-Shieh scheme [4] assuming that the remote 
host possesses extra storage facilities for storing some 
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information.  
Again, Yang, Wang, and Chang [2] proposed an alternative 
improved solution considering the attacks showed in [5] and 
[10]. Later Kim et al. [3] showed two attacks on Yang-
Wang-Chang’s scheme. In addition to those two attacks, we 
have devised two more attacks that could be launched 
against [2].  
So far Kim et al.’s scheme has remained unchallenged for 
timestamp-based authentication procedure. After analyzing 
their scheme we have again found that, even Kim et al.’s 
improved scheme is vulnerable. We prove in this paper that 
our recently proposed solution [13] has the least probability 
of such attacks. 
The long sequence of all these works motivated us to review 
all of these so that a clear picture could be deduced for this 
research field. Hence with our work, we have investigated 
almost all the related schemes to analyze the weaknesses of 
various timestamp-based password authentication schemes. 
3. Review of Basic Yang-Shieh Scheme 
Before presenting the proofs of the vulnerabilities of various 
schemes, first we note down the basic timestamp-based 
password authentication scheme that was proposed by Yang 
and Shieh in 1999 [4]. 
 
3.1 Basic Terms and Preliminaries 
iU  – The ith user seeking for authentication 
KIC – The Key Information Center 
iID  – The chosen identity of the user iU  
iPW  – The password chosen by iU   
iCID  – The identity of the smart card associated with 
iU  
(.)f  – A one-way hash function. A one-way function is a 
transfer function f where given p, it is fairly easy to compute, 
)( pfq =  in the forward direction, but given q, it is 
computationally very difficult to find out a p using the 
inverse such that, p = )(1 qf − . 
3.2 Basic Timestamp-Based Password Authentication 
Scheme 
This scheme has mainly three phases; registration, login, and 
verification phase. Here, we mention the steps of all the 
phases in detail. 
Registration Phase. The KIC sets up the authentication 
system and issues smart cards to iU  who requests for 
registration. It is assumed that, this phase occurs over a 
secure channel. The steps that are followed in this phase are: 
1. iU  securely submits arbitrarily chosen iID  and 
iPW to the KIC and in turn the following operations are 
done by the KIC. 
2. Two large prime numbers p and q are generated, and let 
qpn ⋅=  
3. A prime number e and an integer d are chosen which 
satisfy, e·d ≡ 1 mod (p-1)(q-1), where, e is the public key of 
the KIC that should be published and d is the secret key that 
is kept undisclosed. 
4. An integer g is found which is a primitive element in 
both GF(p) and GF(q), where g is the public information of 
the KIC. 
5. mod nIDS dii =  is computed as iU ’s secret 
information. 
6. A value ih  for iU  is computed such that, 
mod ngh dPWi i
⋅=  and smart card’s identifier iCID  is 
generated. 
7. Then the information n, e, g, iID , iCID , iS , ih , and 
(.)f  are written into the smart card’s memory and the card 
is issued to iU . 
Login Phase. When Ui needs to login to the system, the 
smart card should be attached to the login device and IDi and 
PWi need to be keyed in by the user. After that, the smart 
card performs the following operations: 
1. Generates random number ri and computes iX  and iY  
such that: 
mod ngX ii PWri
⋅=  and mod nhSY TCIDfriii ii ),(⋅⋅=  
Here, T is the current timestamp. 
2. Sends the login request message, M = { iID , iCID , 
iX , iY , n, e, g, T} to the remote server. 
Verification Phase. After the server has received the 
message M, it carries out the following steps: 
1. Checks the validity of iID  and iCID . If the format of 
any of these is incorrect, the server rejects the request. 
2. Checks whether the condition TTT ∆≤−′ )(  holds or 
not, where T′ is the timestamp of receiving the login request 
message and ∆T is the legitimate time interval allowed for 
the transmission delay. If this condition is violated, the 
server rejects the request. 
4. Checks the equation, mod nXIDY TCIDfii
e
i
i ),(⋅= . If 
it holds, then the remote server accepts the login request and 
gives access to iU . Otherwise, it rejects the login request. 
4. Cryptanalysis of Wang-Li’s Improved 
Scheme 
Wang and Li [1] noticed that the forged login attacks 
proposed by Chan-Cheng [5] and Fan et al. [6], would not 
work without the value of ),( ci TCIDf , where cT  is the 
timestamp of the attacker’s login request. To prevent the 
attacker from getting the value of iCID  in plaintext, they 
proposed a modification of approach that is, in the login 
phase )( iCIDf  should be computed in addition to iX  and 
iY , and instead of iCID , the value of )( iCIDf  should be 
sent with the login request message for verification. To 
facilitate this modification, they assumed that, extra storage 
capabilities are available in the remote host for keeping the 
values of all iCID s. This requirement of extra storage 
surely makes this scheme inefficient compared to the other 
alternative solutions. Another drawback is that their scheme 
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provides only unilateral authentication, where the server 
messages are always thought to be fully secure. Moreover, 
we have found that their modified scheme could also be 
broken with two types of tricky forgery attacks. Here we 
mention the proofs of those attacks. 
 
4.1 First Type of Forged Message Attack 
1. The attacker intercepts the login request message from a 
valid user and gets it as, M = { iID , )( iCIDf , iX , iY , n, 
e, g, T}. 
2. It chooses two prime numbers fp  and fq , and then 
computes a new composite number fff qpn .= . 
3. Chooses a prime number fe  and fd  so that they 
satisfy, ff de ⋅ ≡ 1 mod ( fp -1)( fq  -1). 
4. Sets, 1=fX  and mod nIDY fdif = . 
5. Sends the forged login request message, fM  = 
{ iID , )( iCIDf , fX , fY , fn , fe , g, fT }, where fT  is 
the attacker’s attack launching timestamp. 
6. This false message could pass the verification phase in 
the remote server because, 
 
fe
fY  = mod nID ff
ed
i  
⋅  =  mod nIDi   
and, 
 
mod nXID fi TCIDffi  )(
),(⋅ mod n1ID fi TCIDfi  )( ),(⋅=  
mod nIDi  =  
 
4.2 Second Type of Forgery Attack 
1. The attacker intercepts the login request message from a 
valid user and gets it as, M = { iID , )( iCIDf , iX , iY , n, 
e, g, T}. 
2. Sets fe   = 1, 1X f =  and mod nIDY if  = . 
3. Sends the login request to the remote server, fM = 
{ iID , )( iCIDf , fX , fY , n , fe , g, fT }, where fT  is 
the timestamp of attackers login request. 
4. This trial succeeds as, 
 
fe
fY  = mod nIDi  )(
1  = mod nIDi   
 
and, 
 
mod nXID fi TCIDffi  )(
),(⋅ mod n1ID fi TCIDfi  )( ),(⋅=  
 
mod nIDi  =  
 
Both of these attacks could be launched because there is 
no step in their scheme which could verify the values of the 
parameters included in the login request message. Just by 
setting up the necessary values, an attacker can succeed to 
break Wang-Li’s scheme. The first of these attacks could be 
launched because the parameter values are sent in open text 
and the attacker could replace the values for a forged 
message. The second attack could be resisted if there is 
another extra step to verify the value of e, fX  along with 
the values of iID  and iCID . 
So in a nutshell, in this section we have pointed out that, 
1. Wang-Li’s scheme is inefficient because of the 
requirement for extra storage which could be huge for 
supporting a large number of users. 
2. Their scheme is vulnerable to two types of simple 
forgery attacks as the parameters passed with the login 
request are open and could be replaced by an attacker 
according to its needs. As there is no checking step for 
validating the parameters or structures of parameters, the 
scheme could be broken. 
5. Cryptanalysis of Yang-Wang-Chang’s 
Improved Scheme 
In this section, we mention four different types of forgery 
attacks on Yang-Wang-Chang password authentication 
scheme. Kim et al. [3] pointed out first two attacks which we 
mention here. In addition, we show two more novel attacks 
on Yang-Wang-Chang scheme to prove that, their scheme is 
fairly vulnerable in contrast of their claim of its intractable 
security [14]. 
 
5.1 Attack Based on [8] and [10] 
As the attacker can intercept the login request message M = 
{ iID , iCID , iX , iY , n, e, g, T}, it can get the valid values 
of iID  and iCID . Using these values it could launch a 
forgery attack as follows: 
1. Let aT  be the timestamp for the attacker’s login 
request. Use the Extended Euclidean algorithm to compute 
gcd(e, aT ) = 1 that is, e and aT  are relatively prime. Let, u 
and v be the coefficients computed by the extended 
Euclidean algorithm such that, e.u – aT .v = 1 
2. Compute mod nIDX vCIDif i  
⋅=  
3. Compute mod nIDY uCIDif i  
⋅=  
4. Send the forged login request message fM  = { iID , 
iCID , fX , fY , n, e, g, aT } and this request will 
eventually pass the authentication phase as, 
 
                       efY mod nID
uCID
i
i  )( e⋅=  
 
                             mod nID iCIDi  )(
eu=  
 
                             mod nID vCIDi i  )( a
T1 ⋅+=  
 
                             mod nIDID vCIDi
CID
i
ii  )( aT ⋅⋅=  
 
                             mod nXID f
CID
i
i  )( aT⋅=  
 
In fact, this attack could be extended for gcd(e,a)=2,3,…. 
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instead of only gcd(e, a) = 1. Hence, the claim that their 
improved scheme is resistant to Sun et al.’s [10] attack or 
similar attacks is not correct. 
5.2   Forgery Attack Based on Yang et al.’s [11] Attack  
In this attack the attacker intercepts the message, M = { iID , 
iCID , iX , iY , n, e, g, T} and then: 
1. Finds a value w such that it satisfies, TTw a =⋅ , 
where aT  denotes the attacker’s attack launching time. 
2. Computes the value, fX  = 
w
iX  = mod ng
wPWr ii  ⋅⋅  
3. Now, the attacker constructs the forged login request 
message as, fM  = { iID , iCID , fX , iY , n, e, g, aT } 
This forged message eventually passes the authentication 
phase because: 
 
            eiY mod nhS
Tr
ii
i  )( e⋅⋅=  
 
                  mod ngID TrdPWdCIDi iii  )(
e⋅⋅⋅⋅ ⋅=  
 
                  mod ngID TrPWCIDi iii  
⋅⋅⋅=  
 
                                               and, 
 
mod nXID ai Tf
CID
i  )(⋅⋅ mod ngID aiii TwPWrCIDi  ⋅⋅⋅⋅ ⋅=  
 
                                             mod ngID TrPWCIDi iii  
⋅⋅⋅ ⋅=  
5.3   Our Novel Impersonation Attack 
Based on the attacks shown in [13] and [14], an attacker can 
impersonate a legitimate user iU , with identity iID , by 
using the following procedure: 
1. It Intercepts the login request message M = { iID , 
iCID , iX , iY , n, e, g, T}.  
2. Computes, mod nIDID if  
1−=  
3. Now, the attacker submits the identity fID  and a 
random value as his password to the KIC to obtain a valid 
smart card with information {n, e, g, fID , fCID , kS , kh  
and (.)f }. 
4. Since in the registration phase in their scheme, 
mod nIDS dCIDii i
⋅=  and here, mod nIDS dCIDfk i ⋅=  
mod nID dCIDi i
⋅−= , the attacker can compute iS  as, 
mod nSS ki  
1−=  
5. Then, the attacker chooses a random integer y. 
6. Sets, mod nyX ef  =  and mod nySY fTif  ⋅= , 
where fT  is the timestamp for the login request from the 
attacker and sends the forged login message, fM  = { iID , 
iCID , fX , fY , n, e, g, fT }. The request is validated as 
the login request from the user iU  because, 
 
                  efY    mod nyS
eT
i
f  )( ⋅=  
 
                           mod nyS eTk f  )(
1 ⋅= −  
                    
                           mod nyID eTedCIDi fi  
⋅⋅⋅ ⋅=  
 
                           mod nXID fi Tf
CID
i  )(⋅=  
 
5.4   Our Novel Forgery Attack 
The attacker can get the values of iID  and iCID  from the 
login request message from the valid user, and the smart card 
identifier iCID  is a fixed value for a particular login request 
from a user. The attacker could launch an attack using the 
following steps: 
1. The attacker finds a value fT  such that,  
fTT ⋅  ≡ 1 mod n where fT  is the attacker’s login 
timestamp 
2. It chooses a random integer k and computes,  
mod nkY fTf  = and sets mod nkIDX eTCIDif i  . ⋅= −  
3. Sends the forged login request message, fM  =  { iID , 
iCID , fX , fY , n, e, g, fT } 
4. The attacker could pass the authentication phase as, 
 
                           efY mod nk f
Te  ⋅=  
 
                                          and, 
 
                   mod nXID fi Tf
CID
i  )(⋅  
                       
                     mod nkIDID fii TeTCIDi
CID
i  )( ⋅⋅= ⋅−  
 
                     mod nkIDID ffii TeTTCIDi
CID
i  
. ⋅⋅− ⋅⋅=  
                      
                     mod nkIDID fii TeCIDi
CID
i  
⋅− ⋅⋅=  
 
                     mod nk fTe  ⋅=  
6. Cryptanalysis of Kim et al.’s Improved 
Scheme 
In 2005, Kim et al. [3] proposed an improvement on Yang-
Wang-Chang’s [2] timestamp-based password authentication 
scheme. In their proposal, they modified some of the 
calculations and checking steps keeping the basic working 
method same as the previous scheme. In their scheme, they 
kept the registration phase exactly similar as Yang-Wang-
Chang scheme. In the login phase, iX  and iY  are calculated 
differently as, mod ngX erPWi ii  
⋅⋅=  and 
mod nShY Ti
r
ii
i  ⋅=  where, T is the current timestamp. In 
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the verification phase, for the final checking step the 
equation was changed to, mod nIDXY TCIDi
d
i
e
i
i  ⋅⋅= . So 
far, Kim et al.’s scheme has not been challenged and has 
been thought to be fully secure. After analyzing their 
scheme, we have found that even it could be broken with a 
tricky forgery attack based on an attack presented in [13]. 
Our Novel Impersonation Attack on Kim et al. 
Scheme. An attacker can impersonate a legitimate user by 
using the following procedure: 
1. It Intercepts the login request message M = { iID , 
iCID , iX , iY , n, e, g, T}. 
2. Computes, mod nIDID if  
1−=  
3. Now, the attacker submits this identity fID  and a 
chosen password to the KIC to obtain a valid smart card with 
information {n, e, g, fID , fCID , kS , kh , and (.)f }. 
4. Since, in the registration phase in their scheme, 
 
                                  mod nIDS dCIDii i
⋅=   
 
and here, mod nIDmod nIDS dcidi
dCID
fk
ii  ⋅−⋅ == , the 
attacker can compute iS  as,  mod nSS ki  
1−= . 
5. Then, the attacker chooses a random integer y. 
6. Sets, 1X f =  and mod nSY fTif  = , where fT  is the 
timestamp for the login request from the attacker and then 
sends the forged login message, fM  = { iID , iCID , fX , 
fY , n, e, g, fT }. The request is validated as the login 
request from the user iU  because, 
 
                     efY mod nS
eT
i
f  )(=  
 
                           mod nS eTk f  
⋅−=  
 
                           mod nID fi TedCIDi  
⋅⋅⋅=  
 
                           mod nID fi TCIDi  
⋅=  
 
                                              and, 
 
     mod nIDX fi TCIDi
d
i  
⋅⋅ mod nID1 fi TCIDi  )( ⋅⋅=  
 
                                              mod nID fi TCIDi  
⋅=  
 
This attack could be resisted by imposing another extra 
step in the verification step to check the values of the 
parameters passed via the login request message. 
7. Comments on the Improved Authentication 
Schemes 
All the improved schemes mentioned here have a common 
drawback that is, none of them provides bilateral 
verification. All of the mentioned schemes, Wang-Li, Yang-
Wang-Chang, and Kim et al. schemes consider that the 
server message is always secure. But, while using insecure 
channels, an ideal environment might not exist all the times. 
Hence, a bilateral verification mechanism is necessary where 
the user would also get the opportunity to verify the 
messages sent from the remote server. Most of these schemes 
are vulnerable because of the passing of the critical 
parameters with the login request message in plaintext. As 
there is no mechanism to conceal the actual values of iID , 
iCID , iX , iY , n, e, g, T, some attacks could be launched 
simply by replacing the values with necessary terms and 
conditions. To resolve the problems and inefficiency of all 
these schemes we have recently proposed our improved 
scheme and proved that it is not tractable by any of the 
known attacks. 
8. Our Established Solution for Overcoming 
the Flaws 
For the completeness of this paper, we present our scheme 
[13] here which so far has withstood all types of scrutiny and 
cryptanalysis. None of the above mentioned attacks or any 
other known attacks could be launched against our scheme. 
Also this scheme ensures bilateral verification. Hence, to the 
best of our knowledge, this is the best solution among all the 
alternate solutions (that use the similar working principles). 
Registration Phase. The KIC sets up the authentication 
system and issues smart cards to Ui who requests for 
registration. It is assumed that, this phase occurs over a 
secure channel. The steps that are followed in this phase are: 
1. iU  securely submits iID  and iPW  to the KIC and in 
turn the following operations are done by the KIC. 
2. Two large prime numbers p and q are generated, and let 
qpn ⋅=  
3. A prime number e and an integer d are chosen which 
satisfy, de.  ≡ 1 mod (p-1)(q-1), where, e is the public key 
of the KIC that should be published and d is the secret key 
that is kept undisclosed. 
4. An integer g is found which is a primitive element in 
both GF(p) and GF(q), where g is the public information of 
the KIC. 
5. mod nIDS dii  =  is computed as iU ’s secret 
information. 
6.  ih for iU  is computed such that, mod ngh
dPW
i
i  ⋅= . 
7. iCID  is computed as, iCID  = f( iID  ⊕ d), where ⊕ 
stands for an exclusive operation. 
8. Then the information n, e, g, iID , iCID , iS , ih , and 
f(.) are written into the smart card’s memory and the card is 
issued to iU . 
Login Phase. In the login phase, iU  attaches the smart 
card with the reader device and keys in his iID  and iPW . 
Then the smart card performs the following operations: 
1. Generates a random number ir  and computes iX , iY  
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and iZ  as follows: 
                      mod ngX ii PWri  
⋅=  
 
                      mod nhSY TCIDfriii ii  
),(⋅⋅=  
 
                      ),( iiiii YCIDfCIDXZ ⊕⊕=  
 
Here, T is the current timestamp. 
2. Sends the login request message, M = { iID , iY , iZ , 
n, e, g, T} 
Mutual Authentication Phase. When the server gets the 
login request message, it performs the operations: 
1. Checks the validity of iID . If the format of the iID  is 
incorrect, the server rejects the request. 
2. Checks whether the condition (T′-T) ≤ ∆T holds or not, 
where T′ is the timestamp of receiving the login request 
message and ∆T is the legitimate time interval allowed for 
the transmission delay. If the condition does not hold, the 
server rejects the request. 
3. Computes, CIDi′  = f( iID  ⊕ d) and val = f(CIDi′, Yi). 
Then, computes, Zi ⊕ CIDi′ ⊕ val which should generate the 
value of Xi as CIDi′  = f(IDi ⊕ d) = CIDi for the legitimate 
users. 
4. Checks the equation, mod nXIDY TCIDfii
e
i
i  ),(⋅= . If 
it holds, then the remote server accepts the login request and 
gives access to Ui, otherwise rejects the request as it implies 
that the value of Xi that is generated in the previous step is 
not correct. 
5. Once, the user Ui is authenticated by the server, to 
provide mutual authentication, the server now computes, R = 
(f(CIDi′, T′′))d mod n where, T′′ is the current timestamp and 
returns M′ = {R, T′′} to the user Ui. 
After receiving the message M′, the user Ui authenticates 
it as follows: 
1. Checks the legal time interval, (T′′′-T′′) ≤ ∆T, where 
T′′′ is the timestamp of receiving the message M′. If it is 
positive, it goes forward; otherwise rejects the server 
message. 
2. Calculates R′ = Re mod n = (f(CIDi, T′′)d)e = f(CIDi, 
T′′). If the condition, R′ = f(CIDi, T′′) does not hold, then the 
remote server is rejected, otherwise the mutual 
authentication is succeeded. 
Password Renewal. If Ui needs to change his password, 
he has to go through the registration phase where he submits 
his identity and the new password, and accordingly the KIC 
performs the steps 5 to 7. 
The details of security analysis and strengths of our 
improved scheme are mentioned in [13]. Here, we mention 
our scheme as a reference. 
9. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have presented a detailed literature review 
of the timestamp-based password authentication schemes 
using smart cards. We have investigated a number of 
schemes, noted how they have been developed and proved 
some of their flaws and inefficiencies. For the completeness 
of the paper, we have also mentioned our recently proposed 
solution which to the best of our knowledge is the best 
solution up to this moment. 
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